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Abstract. - Here we show that for coupled-map systems, the length of the transient prior to
synchronization is both dependant on the coupling strength and dynamics of connections: systems
with fixed connections and with no self-coupling display quasi-instantaneous synchronization.
Too strong tendency for synchronization would in terms of brain dynamics be expected to be
a pathological case. We relate how the time to synchrony depends on coupling strength and
connection dynamics to the latency between neuronal stimulation and conscious awareness. We
suggest that this latency can be identified with the delay before a threshold level of synchrony
is achieved between distinct regions within the brain, as suggested by recent empirical evidence,
in which case the latency can easily be understood as the inevitable delay before such synchrony
builds-up. This is demonstrated here through the study of simplistic coupled-map models.
Introduction. – When the brain receives a sensory
stimulus, there is a delay before we become consciously
aware of it [1] [2] [3]. An explanation as to what causes
the delay or what mechanisms occur during this latency
is still outstanding. Separately, the moment of conscious
awareness has empirically been associated with higher lev-
els of synchrony between distinct brain regions [4] [5]. Here
we show that for certain ranges of interaction strength,
generic coupled systems display a delay between the time
they begin to interact and when they achieve synchrony.
We propose that the need for such a delay in these simple
systems, and its dependence on the strength of interac-
tion, can provide insight into the mechanisms at play in
the brain during the latency between sensory stimuli and
conscious awareness. If this latency is identified as the
delay before a threshold level of synchrony is achieved be-
tween distinct regions within the brain, it can easily be
understood since a delay is inevitable for such synchrony
to build-up as demonstrated here by our simplistic models.
Current views of cognition, assume it to be a direct re-
sult of the physical & chemical interactions of the millions
of neurons that make up our brains. This notion has been
extended in the Electromagnetic Field Theory of Mind,
the essence of which can be understood as “...conscious-
ness is identical with certain spatiotemporal patterns in
the electromagnetic field” [6].
Healthy cognition requires a careful balance be-
tween large-scale integration and distributed dynamics of
anatomically and functionally segregated brain regions [7].
Too much neuronal synchronization having been associ-
ated with known pathologies such as epilepsy [8] [9] and
pathological tremors [10] [11]. Whilst too little synchro-
nization has been linked to schizophrenia [12]. Other em-
pirical evidence suggests that synchronization plays an im-
portant role in cognition [13], in particular, synchroniza-
tion plays an integral role in conscious awareness [4] [5].
So, for conscious awareness, a careful balance of the cor-
rect level of synchrony must be achieved: too little or too
much could be pathological, yet enough is needed to raise
awareness from sub-conscious to conscious. However, this
has yet to add any insights to the contentious issue of the
precise timing of conscious awareness.
The question of exactly when we become consciously
aware of sensory stimuli is of course an ancient philo-
sophical one, but has opened up to scientific investiga-
tion (and discussion) since the seminal work of Libet and
co-workers (see [14] and references therein for details of
the original research). Much attention has been given to
the sparse data, with debate over Libet’s conclusions last-
ing over many decades (see for example the special issue:
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Consciousness and Cognition, Vol 11, Issue 2 (2002) and
references therein).
Whilst some of Libet’s conclusions still remain highly
contentious (a good overview of the criticisms is given in
[3] & [15]), there is agreement, based on Libet’s results and
other backward masking experiments, that there exists a
latency between sensory stimulation and conscious aware-
ness of it [1] [2] [3]. The precise duration of this latency
is not confirmed, with estimates ranging from tens [2] to
hundreds [1] of milliseconds. It should, however, be noted
that whatever the precise duration for any particular stim-
ulus, in general, it is variable; dependant on a number of
factors including the nature of the stimulus, whether it is
direct cortical stimulation, visual etc. and the intensity of
the stimulus. Longer latencies being associated with lower
intensity stimuli [1] [3].
Whilst the models used here are not intended to be in-
terpreted as one-to-one models of neurons or even collec-
tions of neurons, it is expected that the same basic mech-
anisms in action within these simplified systems are also
at play in more complicated and realistic neuronal models.
By using simplified models we can gain a useful insight into
these mechanisms that can be easily lost in the details of
more realistic neuronal models, that would inevitably be
more complicated. We show that basic coupled systems
with co-evolving connections never synchronize instanta-
neously; they require a certain period of interaction for
the synchronicity to build up. This period is longer for
weaker interactions, similar to the latency between brain
stimuli and conscious awareness being longer for weaker
stimuli. If for conscious awareness to occur, a certain level
of synchrony is required in the brain, we should in fact ex-
pect there to be a latency between stimulus and conscious
awareness.
The Model and Results. – We compare the be-
haviour of two coupled-map systems: the first is a simple
globally-coupled-map system with all-to-all connections.
It consists of N nodes that are each coupled to every other
node with strength c(N−1) . Each node’s state, x
i
n, evolves
according to:
xin+1 = f
[
(1− c) · xin +
c
N − 1 ·
N∑
j=1
xjn
]
(1)
The second is a more involved model, the basic distinction
being that the connections between nodes are directional,
weighted and co-evolve along with the nodes. They evolve
according to Hebbian dynamics, so alike nodes have their
connections strengthened at the expense of other connec-
tions between nodes that have states less alike. It is de-
scribed by the following equations:
xin+1 = f
[
(1− c) · xin + c ·
N∑
j=1
wijn · xjn
]
(2)
where the wijn evolve according to
wijn+1 =
[1 + δ · g(xin, xjn)] · wijn∑N
j=1[1 + δ · g(xin, xjn)] · wijn
(3)
g(xin, x
j
n) = 1− 2 · |xin − xjn| (4)
where c ∈ [0, 1] is the coupling strength, xin ∈ R, i =
1, 2, ..., N and wijn denotes the weighted & directional con-
nectivity network. The parameter δ governs the plasticity
of the network, we use δ = 0.1. We use the logistic map
as the underlying map: f(x) = ax · (1 − x). This second
model, Eq. (2), was previously studied in [16] [17], where
it was shown that the global parameter space splits into
different phases, as shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1: Here is shown how the system of Eq. (2) displays differ-
ent global behaviours in different areas of the parameter space:
coherent (C), the whole system synchronizes. Ordered (O),
the system consists of several clusters within which the nodes
are synchronized. Disordered (D), there is no synchronization
between any pair of nodes, so their node-states all evolve in-
dependently. This is a reproduction of that shown as fig. 1
in [17].
To relate the time to synchronization and the stabil-
ity of the time evolution we also measure the transverse
Lyapunov exponent according to(see Ref. [17])
λ⊥ = ln
∣∣∣1− c ·N
N − 1
∣∣∣+ λ0 (5)
where λ0 is the Lyapunov exponent of the underlying map
f calculated from the usual expression [18]
λ0 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
n=1
ln
∣∣∣f ′(xin)∣∣∣, (6)
where we use T = 104 and have checked this value to
be sufficiently large for a < 4. At a = 4 we use the ex-
act value λ⊥ = ln(2), see Ref. [19]. For the logistic map,
λ0 is highly dependent on the nonlinearity parameter a,
p-2
Delay before synchronization & its role in latency of sensory awareness
so in the figures 2, 3 and 4 below, we plot the values of
λ0 corresponding to the a-values used for the underlying
map of the dynamical nodes in Eqs. (1) and (2). The
transverse Lyapunov exponent denotes the stability of the
synchronous state for the fixed system of Eq. (1): positive
(negative) values corresponding to the synchronous state
being unstable (stable). It has previously been assumed
that this same transverse Lyapunov exponent also denotes
the stability of the synchronous state of Eq. (2) [17], since
when the system displays coherent behaviour, the connec-
tions become static and almost homogeneous with value
wijn
1
(N−1) . Below we show the Lyapunov exponent to-
gether with the time to synchronization. We would ex-
pect the coupled maps to be able to synchronize when
λ⊥ < 0. We find indeed that change of sign of the Lya-
punov exponent obtained from Eqs. (5) and (6) coincides
with the divergence of the time to synchrony for the case
with constant couplings, see the dashed line in Figs. 2, 3
and 4. However, the divergence of the time to synchrony
for the system with dynamical couplings does not coincide
with the change of sign of λ⊥ derived from Eqs. (5) and
(6). From this we conclude that the true Lyapunov ex-
ponent for the interacting system is not sufficiently accu-
rately represented by Eqs. (5) and (6). Unfortunately it is
not possible to obtain an accurate numerical estimate from
the Lyapunov exponent for the fully interacting system by
direct averaging over the orbits. The computational pro-
cessing required is prohibitive, since a reasonable density
of points across the entire phase space is needed. In the
coupled systems, it is nontrivial to get such a density of
points in the 100 dimensional phase space.
The simpler system of Eq. (1) also displays different be-
haviours throughout the parameter space, the interested
reader is referred to [20] for further details. Here, we are
concerned with the time it takes for the system to reach
the Coherent state where all nodes are completely syn-
chronized, so we shall not dwell further on the specifics of
these models as the qualitative behaviour we focus on is
believed to be a general feature of all coupled systems able
to reach a state of synchronicity. In the case of systems de-
fined in Eqs. (1) & (2), we define them to be synchronized
if
σ2 = lim
n−→∞
∑
all pairs i,j
|xin − xjn| = 0 (7)
In practice, for numerical studies, we must consider sys-
tems to be synchronized if σ2 is less than some threshold
δthr. The results shown in Figs. 2 and 3 show how long it
takes for the system to re-synchronize: each time the sys-
tem reaches the synchronous state, each node-state, xin, is
perturbed by a random number η < 10−2, whilst ensuring
that xin ∈ [0, 1] is not violated.
From Figs. 2 and 3 we see that the time required before
synchrony is achieved varies dramatically for different cou-
pling strengths. Neither system synchronizes (before the
cut-off time of 104) for low coupling strength, but is able to
synchronize for coupling strengths greater than some crit-
ical coupling strength. For the values of coupling strength
where the systems synchronize, the time it takes them to
synchronize decreases as the coupling strength increases.
It should also be noted that for all values of the coupling
strength, c, the system with fixed all-to-all coupling of
Eq. (1), takes fewer iterations to synchronize than does the
system with co-evolving connections. This becomes quite
a stark difference when the system with fixed connections
achieves synchrony quasi-instantaneously at c = 0.99. By
quasi-instantaneous we mean that due to the discrete na-
ture of the system, it is not possible to record a shorter
time difference than 1 timestep. Indeed, for c = 0.99, we
observe synchronization from one timestep to the next.
Both systems are also able to synchronize when a ran-
dom subset of the nodes are driven by an external stim-
ulus. We imagine this mode of driving to be related to
how dynamics of the brain responds to stimula. We im-
plement the driving by choosing a random subset of nodes
to receive the external drive, whose node-state evolution
is altered as follows:
xin+1 = f
[
(1−c)·xin+c·
N∑
j=1
wijn ·xjn+
c
NTot. − 1 ·x
drive
n
]
(8)
where Ntot. is the sum of the number of nodes and the
number of stimuli. Fig. 4 shows the time required to
achieve synchrony for different coupling strengths for these
driven systems with two types of external stimuli:
(A) xdriven = sin
2(ωn)
(B) xdriven+1 = astimulus · xdriven · (1− xdriven )
The first drive type, A, is a simple oscillatory drive and the
frequencies used are chosen as inverse of the average return
time through a Poincare´ section for the undriven system.
However we note that similar responses are seen for other
frequencies. The second drive type, B, is a logistic map
with mismatched nonlinearity parameter (astimulus). This
is used as there has been evidence to suggest that functions
with the form of the logistic map may indeed be of direct
relevance in neuroscience [21].
Similar to the undriven system, no synchrony occurs
for low coupling strength. Whereas, for higher coupling
strengths, the systems are again able to synchronize for
coupling strengths larger than a critical strength, ccrit..
For both drive types, A and B, the system with fixed con-
nectivity takes shorter times to synchronize. When the
fixed connectivity system is driven by drive type B, it
again displays the quasi-instantaneous synchronicity for
c & 0.96.
Discussion. – Whilst these simple models are not in-
tended to be, nor could they ever be conceived to offer,
a one-to-one model of neuronal dynamics, the general ap-
proach to synchronization is of relevance to the question of
what mechanisms cause the delay between sensory stimuli
and conscious awareness. From such simple systems, we
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Fig. 2: The time it takes for the system with fixed couplings,
see Eq. (1) (dashed line), and with dynamical couplings, see
Eq. (2) (solid line), to re-synchronize after being perturbed.
The data here is for different coupling strengths, c and fixed
nonlinearity parameter, a = 3.97, as schematically indicated
by arrow A of Fig. (1). This particular a-value is that used
in the previous studies [16] [17]. We show here the average
time for re-synchronization of 100 random initial conditions.
The system is perturbed each time the system synchronizes,
with the synchronous threshold set as δ = 10−25. A value of
104 for the time-required-to-synchronize is indicative that no
synchronization was recorded during the simulations. The solid
line with pluses indicates the Lyapunov exponent calculated
from Eqs. (5) and (6).
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Fig. 3: The same as Figure 2, but for a = 4.00, as schemat-
ically indicated by arrow B of Fig. 1. This a-value is cho-
sen as it is the only rational number of parameter value for
which an absolutely continuous invariant probability measure
has been proven to exist, ensuring a well defined Lyapunov
exponent.The solid line with bullets indicates the Lyapunov
exponent calculated from Eqs. (5) and (6)
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Fig. 4: The time it takes for the driven systems to synchro-
nize, with the synchronous threshold, δ = 10−25. Each system
consists of 100 nodes, 5 of which receive the external stimulus.
The solid lines are for the system with co-evolving connections
whilst the dashed lines are for the system with fixed all-to-all
connections. The stimuli are as follows: (1) drive type A, with
ω = 0.28 and a = 3.97 (4); (2) drive type A, with ω = 0.28
and a = 4.00 (); (3) drive type B, with astimulus = 4.0 and
a = 3.97 (©). All data is shown as the average over 100 ran-
dom initial conditions. A value of 104 for the time-required-to-
synchronize is indicative that no synchronization was recorded
during the simulations.The solid line (pluses a = 3.97, bullets
a = 4.00) indicates the Lyapunov exponent calculated from
Eqs. (5) and (6)
hope to gain insight into the mechanisms at play in more
complicated, physically realistic models. It is believed that
this basic result of a delayed onset of synchronization, as
displayed by these simple models, is a universal feature
amongst coupled systems capable of synchronicity.
For real neural systems we expect the regime of c
close to one to be most relevant as this corresponds to a
large number of in put from other neurones. With this
in mind we note that the observation that the system
with fixed coupling is able to achieve synchrony quasi-
instantaneously is suggestive that time-evolving connec-
tions are of utmost importance within neuronal models.
Only with co-evolving connections is it guaranteed that
quasi-instantaneous synchronization does not occur. The
behaviours of these models suggest however, that it is per-
haps necessary to have a comparatively higher strength of
connection in order to achieve the same duration of delay
before synchronization if the connections co-evolve along
with the nodes as compared with having fixed connectiv-
ity.
When looking to real neuronal connections, it is ex-
pected that they should not be static in time. In-
deed, changes are observed in connectivity across many
timescales. We have here highlighted the difference to
timings of synchrony that such time-varying connections
can make.
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It is also interesting to note the potential extrapola-
tions and insights possible from a greater understanding
of the interplay between the levels of synchronization in
the brains of epileptics and potential underlying causes.
Could it for example be possible that epileptics have less
time-dependence in their neuronal connectivity? Does this
allow them to have faster reaction times as a consequence?
Future work is required into the existence of similar la-
tencies before synchrony in more neurologically accurate
models, as well as other simple empirical observations in
order to answer these questions with certainty.
It still remains, however, that coupled systems require a
critical level of interaction, above which, the time it takes
for them to synchronize decreases as the coupling strength
is increased. This is of importance for understanding the
latency between sensory stimuli and conscious awareness
of this stimulus. Indeed, if conscious awareness is identi-
fied with gaining threshold levels of synchronization as im-
plied by recent empirical evidence [5], we should actually
expect there to be a delay between the stimulus and con-
scious awareness, since in any system with time-varying
connections, it takes time for synchronicity to build up.
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